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Walking a Thin Blue Line:
Balancing the Citizen's Right to Record Police
Officers Against Officer Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION

One bystander with a cell phone can change an individual's encounter with law enforcement from an unprovable allegation of
abuse to a media sensation. Audio and video recording, a capability
in nearly every American's pocket, has changed the way that citizens
interact with police officers. Today, the technology that immortalized
the police beating of Rodney King exposes excessive force used on
the Occupy Wall Street protestors, 1 monitors the actions of officers
making arrests, 2 and allows individuals to memorialize their conversations with investigators. 3 Recordings of law enforcement activity
create not only clear evidentiary accounts that benefit victims and
innocent police officers, but also strengthen incentives for law enforcement to use only reasonable force or risk being exposed to the
media, facing professional discipline, or even prosecution. Compelled by these public policy considerations, most states have enacted statutes to protect the recording rights of citizens. However,
many recorders find out too late that they have recorded a police officer in the wrong state and, when they attempt to use their recordings to expose questionable behavior, are arrested themselves.
Federal and state anti-wiretapping and anti-eavesdropping statutes are primarily designed to protect the privacy rights of those
whose conversations might be recorded without their knowledge.
However, these same statutes can often have consequences that
reach far beyond this well-meaning goal. In many instances, law enforcement officers can utilize these statutes to arrest citizens that are

l. Ginia Bellafante, Every Action Produces Overreaction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at MBl;
jennifer Medina, California's Campus Movements Dig In Their Heels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at
A17.

2. Don Terry, Eavesdropping Laws Mean That Turning On an Audio Recorder Could Send You to
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 23, 2011, at A29B (describing a street artist who recorded his arrest for
selling art without a permit).
3. Id. (describing a woman who recorded her interactions with police investigators while
filing a sexual harassment complaint against another police officer).
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recording the officers' interactions with the public. The ostensible
purpose of this application is to protect the safety and privacy of the
police officers.
When statutes are interpreted in this way, they spill beyond the
bounds of individual privacy and begin to invade the First Amendment speech rights of the public. As written, many state recording
statutes demonstrably violate the First Amendment. Others can be
applied to violate those rights. This Comment argues that in order to
strike an appropriate balance between First Amendment speech
rights and the strong public interest in protecting police safety and
privacy, state legislatures should amend these eavesdropping statutes to include a strong rebuttable presumption in favor of the citizen recorder. Underlying this rebuttable presumption is the argument that when police officers act in their official capacity, the public
policy reasons behind protecting an individual's privacy are diminished and ultimately outweighed by the incentives to encourage free
speech. The presumption against the officer would not be absolute:
in cases where the interest in officer privacy and protection are very
strong and outweigh free speech concerns, the officer may have the
opportunity to rebut the presumption in court.
Part II of this Comment will review the relevant state statutory
and case law that has led to inconsistent rules and has resulted in
free speech violations. Part III will address the tension between protecting First Amendment rights and the value of protecting police officers and will explain when it is appropriate for each to be impaired
for the sake of the other. Part IV will explain the need for and benefits of a rebuttable presumption against police privacy. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND

An individual's right to record an encounter with a police officer
depends largely on the state recording statute where the encounter
occurs, the state case law interpreting the recording statute, and the
constitutional rules adopted by the applicable circuit court. The
combination of these legal rules often leads to ambiguity. This Part
will explain the varying rules that have been adopted by states as
well as recount the major statutory interpretations of the laws by
both state and federal courts.
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A. Variation in State Statutory Law

Recording statutes, generally characterized as prohibitions on
wiretapping or eavesdropping, vary widely across states, with some
more likely to favor the citizen and some more likely to favor the police officer. Within this variation, the statutes tend to fall into a few
distinct categories. 4 The majority of state statutes, as well as the federal recording statute, fall into the first category, which permits recorded conversations where at least one of the parties to the conversation agrees to the recording. 5 These "one-party consent" statutes

4. For a detailed explanation of the differences between the federal and state privacy
statutes, see jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State
Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian's Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 487,489-511 (2011).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2511 (2012) (it is not unlawful to intercept a communication
"where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception"); ALA. CODE§ 13A-11-30 (2011) ("eavesdropping" is recording "without the consent of at least one of the persons engaged in the communication"); ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (2011) (prohibiting recording "without the consent of a
party to the conversation"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2011) (felonious to intercept a
conversation "without the consent of a party to such conversation or discussion"); ARK. CODE
AN:--1. § 5-60-120 (2011) (unlawful to intercept "unless the person is a party to the communication or one (I) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent"); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 18-9-304 (2011) (eavesdropping is recording "without the consent of at least one of the principal parties thereto"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-187 (2011) ("wiretapping" is recording without
the consent of at least one party); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (201]) (lawful to intercept a
. has given prior consent"); HAw. REV. STilT. §
communication "where one of the parties
803-42 (2011) (not unlawful to record "when the person is a party . . . or when one of the parties
. has given prior consent"); IDAHO CODF ANN. § 18-6702 (201]) (lawful to intercept
. has given prior consent"); 2012 Ind. Acts 1781 ( "interwhen "when one (I) of the parties
ception" is a recording by someone "other than a sender or receiver" or "without the consent of
the sender or receiver"); IOWA CoDF § 727.8 (2011) ("the sender or recipient of a message or one
who is openly present and participating in or listening to a communication shall not be prohibited hereby from recording such message or communication"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (2011)
(breach of privacy is intercepting a communication "without the confent of the sender or receiver"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 526.010 (West 201 1) (defining eavesdropping as recording "without
the consent of at least one (1) party thereto"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1303 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties . . . has
given prior consent"); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 511 (2011) (using a recording device "without
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy" is a violation of privacy); MINN. STAT.§
626A.02 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or where one
of the parties
.. has given prior consent"); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-29-531 (20 11) (actor is
immune from civil liability if "the person is a party to the communication, or if one (1) of the
parties
. has given prior consent"); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 542.402 (2011) (not unlawful when
"such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties . . . has given prior
consent"); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 86-290 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the
communication or when one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.620 (2011) (unlawful unless "the interception or attempted interception is made with the
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are unlikely to be used to arrest the recorder because the recorder is
often one of the parties to the conversation and is therefore specifically protected by the statutes. 6
Several states, however, have statutes that only permit recordings of oral conversations if all parties to the conversation consent to
the recording. 7 Among these "two-party consent" statutes, there are
varying methods to determine which conversations are protected. In
some states, the anti-recording statute only applies to conversations

prior consent of one of the parties to the communication"); N.j. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-4
(West 2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties . . . has given prior consent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (201 I) (interference with
communications includes recording "without the consent of a sender or intended recipient
thereof"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 201 1) (defining "wiretapping," "mechanical
overhearing," and "intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication" in terms of an ab ..
sence of the consent of at least one party); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-287 (2011) (recording "without the consent of at least one party to the communication" constitutes a felony); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West 2011) (statute doesn't apply when the "person is a party to the
communication or if one of the parties . . . has given the person prior consent"); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 13, §176.4 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or when
one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (2011) (may not
record "unless consent is given by at least one participant"); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-35-21 (2011)
(not unlawful when "the person is a party to the communication, or one of the parties . . . has
given prior consent"); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 17-30-30 (2011) (lawful when "the person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws§ 23A-35A-20 (2011) (person who is "[n]ot a sender or receiver" and records a conversation "without the consent of either a sender or receiver" is guilty of a felony); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-601 (2011) (lawful where "the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 16.02 (West 201 I) (a person who
records has an affirmative defense where "the person is a party to the communication; or one of
the parties . . . has given prior consent"); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-23a-4 (West 2011) (may record when "one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (2011) (
not an offense where "such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties . . .
has given prior consent"); W.VA. CODE§ 62-10-3 (2011) (lawful to record where not unlawful
when "the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties . . . has given
prior consent"); WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2011) (not unlawful when "the person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties . . . has given prior consent"); WYO. STAT. ANN.§
7-3-702 (2011) (does not prohibit recording "where one (I) of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to the interception").
6. It is important to note, however, that under these statutes many valuable recordings
could not be made by bystanders witnessing police abuse, such as the video of the Rodney King
beating. In Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2011), a case that will be explained in more
detail, Simon Glik recorded a police interaction as a bystander and was arrested for it. Recently,
activists in New York City have begun systematically recording police officers engaging in controversial "stop-and-frisk" practices in order to attract attention to alleged police misconduct. See, e.g.,
Kia Gregory,A Watcher of the Police Says He is Now a Target, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at A2l.
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-11-62 (2011) (unlawful to record "without the consent
of all persons observed").
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where the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 8 The
Massachusetts 9 and Montana 10 legislatures have determined that instead of using a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the line
between protected and unprotected communications is drawn by determining whether the recording is made surreptitiously or openly. 11
Washington requires both privacy and secrecy before the recording
will be prohibited. 12 The two-party recording statute in Illinois is
unique, and undoubtedly the harshest in the country. Containing no
explicit expectation of privacy or secrecy requirement, the Illinois re-

8. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 632 (West 2011) (protects "confidential communications," which
are defined as those communications "carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate
that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes
a communication made in . . circumstances in which the parties to the communication may
reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded"); FLA. STAT.§ 934.02
(2011) ("oral communication" is "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation"); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &jUD. PROC. § 10-401 (West 2011) ("'oral communication' means any conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§
750.539c (West 2011) (protects "private conversation[s]"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1
(2011) (protects oral communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation");
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-15-04 (2011) (protects oral communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifYing such expectation"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 5702 (West 2011) (oral communication
only protected if the person uttering it possesses an expectation that the communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.73.030 (West 2011) (protects "private communication" and "private conversation").
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2011) ("interception" means to "secretly
hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record").
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2011) (statute applies to a person who "records or
causes to be recorded a conversation by use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device that reproduces a human conversation without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation").
11. This statutory scheme does not necessarily reject the reasonable expectation of privacy theory. It follows that if a party to the conversation can see that his confidant is holding arecording device, his subjective expectation of privacy, if he continues to have the expectation, is
unlikely to be a "reasonable" expectation. However, by identifying the lack of privacy as the visibility of the recording device, the statutes curtail other factors that may destroy an expectation
of privacy. For example, if two people are having an audible conversation on an open street or in
a crowded room but do not see a recording device, their conversation cannot be recorded, even
though they have clearly forfeited their right to privacy in other Constitutional contexts. See Katz
v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (for purposes of Fourth Amendment privacy from government intrusion, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office," is not protected by privacy, "[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected").
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2011) (consent is considered to have been
obtained when one party has announced to all other parties that the conversation is about to be
recorded).
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cording statute requires the consent of all parties and protects absolutely all conversations. 13 In People v. Beardsley, the Illinois Supreme
Court interpreted the recording statute to include a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement when an arrestee was convicted after recording the officers in the front seat while he was in the back of
the squad car. 14 The court believed that the statute must have been
"based on the assumption that if the parties to a conversation act
under circumstances which entitle them to believe that the conversation is private and cannot be heard by others who are acting in a lawful manner, then they should be protected in their privacy." 15 The
Illinois legislature then amended the statute to make it clear that no
expectation of privacy analysis should be used, and overruled Beardsley. It defined a "conversation" as "any oral communication between
2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation." 16
The next section will explain the consequences of these statutes.
In most states, the state manages to promote its interest in officer
safety without burdening speech rights more than is necessary.
However, the outliers, Massachusetts and Illinois, which have
bright-line rules with no reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, have proven themselves too ripe for potential police abuse to
comfortably fall within constitutional confines.
B. Variations in State Case Law

State recording statutes have been applied in a number of varying
factual situations. Some are situations where it is clear that the public has no compelling interest in protecting the officers, while in others the case is a much closer call. Between the various state statutes
and their interpretive cases, many inconsistencies have developed
that result in a body of case law that is unlikely to be helpful to citizens in understanding their rights.

13. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2011) ("A person commits eavesdropping when
he . . . [k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing
or recording all or any part of any conversation . . . unless he does so . . . with the consent of
all of the parties to such conversation . . .").
14. 503 N.E.2d 346, 347-49 (Ill. 1986).
IS. Id. at 349-50.
16. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 (d) (emphasis added).
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1. Difficulty defining "reasonable expectation of privacy"
The factual circumstances of the recorded conversation play an
integral part in determining if a party has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. For example, a recording of a police officer's conversation
did not violate the state's wire-tapping statute in Commonwealth v.
Henlen because of the non-private nature of the conversation. 17 In
this case out of Pennsylvania, a state in which recording is allowed
unless the officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a state
trooper interviewed a prison guard who secretly recorded an interview and was subsequently charged. 18 However, because police generally record such interviews, and because the trooper took notes
during the interview in question and allowed a third party to be present, the court concluded that the trooper did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 19
In applying a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the
court determines on a case-by-case basis whether the police officer
could have expected the conversation to be kept private. Because this
analysis is fact specific, as the facts of cases become less clear, determining which conversations are private becomes more complicated. In another case, in which it was clear that the police officers did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 20 the court acknowledged that there are some "close case[s]." The court suggested that
protecting law enforcement agents may justify the arrest of a citizen
that is recording police activity in situations where the police have to
make "split-second decisions . . . in the heat of dangerous or potentially dangerous confrontation." 21 This suggestion by Pennsylvania courts is troubling, because the dangerousness of the situation
likely has little correlation to the level of privacy that an officer can
reasonably expect. This leaves open two possible situations where
police can arrest citizen recorders: (1) when the confrontation occurs
in a place where the police officer has a stronger expectation of pri-

17. 564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989).
18. Id. at 905.
19. Id. at 906.
20. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The arrestee in this
case videotaped state police as they performed truck inspections on a public highway because he
was concerned the inspections were being conducted in an unsafe manner. He was "some 20 to
30 feet back from the highway at all relevant times and never interfered with the activities of the
troopers." Id.
21. Id. at 545.
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vacy than he would in a police-recorded interview or during police
action on a public highway (although it is unclear how much stronger the expectation must be) and (2) where an ill-defined "dangerous
situation" justifies the arrest. 22
In contrast to Pennsylvania, courts in Washington have interpreted their reasonable expectation of privacy requirement more definitively.23 For example, in Washington v. Flora, a man claimed that
he had been "handled roughly" and had been the subject of racial
slurs during his arrest. 24 During a subsequent encounter with the
police, he recorded the conversation with a small tape recorder hidden among a stack of papers, because "he feared the deputies would
assault him and use racial slurs as they had done in the past." 25 The
officers discovered the recording device and arrested him for violating Washington's recording statute. 26 In ruling for the arrestee, the
court reasoned that the statute only protected "private conversations," holding that statements made while effectuating arrests are
per se not private. 27 The officers had no reasonable expectation that
the conversation was private because the arrest was on a public
street, within the presence of third parties, and within earshot of
passersby. 28 The court explicitly stated an intention to keep the statute from becoming a tool of police abuse, declaring, "We decline the
State's invitation to transform the privacy act into a sword available
for use against individuals by public officers acting in their official
capacity." 29
While Flora only analyzed conversations made during the course
of an arrest, a subsequent case made it clear that the rule from Flora
should be applied more expansively. 30 In johnson v. Hawe, a teenager
videotaped a police officer speaking on a radio with his window
down in a parking lot. 31 The recording in johnson, unlike the record-

22. !d. at 539, 545 (acknowledging that in a "close case" where the police officer would
have to make a "split second decision . . . in the heat of a dangerous or potentially dangerous
confrontation," it may be appropriate to prohibit citizen recorders).
23. See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
24. Id. at 1355.
25. Id. at 1356.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1357-58.
28. Id. at 1357.
29. Id. at 1358.
30. See johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2004).
31. Id. at 679-80.
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ing in Flora, was not of a conversation between the teenager and the
officer, but rather between the officer and a third party. 32 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit said that the language from Flora "does not
exclude any conduct other than an actual arrest, but encompasses
other conduct that is public and official." 33
The Washington interpretive scheme is likely the best at protecting both the free speech rights of civilians and the privacy rights of
police when an expectation of privacy is justified. However, the rule
still depends on whether the conduct was "public and official." 34
While this standard may be generally easy to apply, police often engage in conduct that is somewhere in between clearly official or unofficial. This gray area of police conduct may lead to uncertainty,
which likely continues to be the source of unnecessary litigation and
chills citizens from exercising their free speech rights.

2. Drawing a line between "hidden" and "open" recording
The Massachusetts wiretap statute, which prohibits recordings
when they are made in "secret," 35 has spawned a series of highly controversial cases that raise logistical and constitutional concerns. In
1998, Michael Hyde was stopped by officers, who ordered him out of
his car, frisked him, examined some of the contents of the car, and
asked him if he was carrying drugs. 36 The stop quickly became confrontational.37 Six days later, H~de went to the police station to file a
complaint against the officers. 8 To substantiate his claim, he produced a tape recording he had surreptitiously made with a recorder in
his pocket. 39 Rather than investigating his claim, authorities charged
Hyde with wiretapping. 40 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the privacy statute as unambiguous, and noted that
there is "no exception for a private individual who secretly records the
oral communications of public officials." 41 The court expressly de-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.at 683.
Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 292, § 99(C) (1) (2011).
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001).
Id.
I d. at 965.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 966.
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dined to interpret the statute with any regard for whether the police
officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy, reasoning that the
plain language of the statute turned on whether or not the interception was made secretly. 42 Hyde was "not prosecuted for making the
recording; he was prosecuted for doing so secretly.'.4 3
Several years later, Simon Glik was on Boston Common and saw
several police officers arresting a young man. 44 Glik was
" [c] oncerned that the officers were employing excessive force to effect the arrest," so he used the camera on his cell phone to record
the exchange. 45 An officer asked him if he was recording audio, Glik
said that he was, and he was arrested for violating the wiretapping
statute. 46 The charges were eventually dismissed because "the law
requires a secret recording and the officers admitted that Glik had
used his cell phone openly and in plain view." 47
3. Enforcing a citizen's right to record
After his charges were dropped, Simon Glik brought a claim
against the officers and the city of Boston under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 48 Section 1983 provides an action for civil damages when an
officer acting under the color of state law deprives a citizen of a constitutional right. 49 In order for an officer to be personally liable in
the suit, it must have been "clearly established" by the case law at
the time that the officer's conduct was a violation of the citizen's
constitutional rights. 50 The First Circuit ultimately determined that
the officers had violated Glik's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure as well as his First
Amendment rights to film police officersY The seizure of his person
and camera was unreasonable, because Glik did not fall within the
ambit of the statute, as his recording was open and not secret. 52

42. Id. at 967--68.
43. !d. at 969.
44. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,79 (1st Cir. 2011).
45. Id. at 79-80.
46. !d. at 80.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. ld.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
50. Harlowv. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982).
51. Glik, 655 F. 3d at 79.
52. Id. at 86-87.
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Glik's First Amendment rights, however, did not depend on whether
the recording was open or secret. Instead, the court affirmed that
there is "a constitutionally frotected right to videotape police carrying
out their duties in public" 5 and that Glik "fell well within the bounds
of the Constitution's protections." 54 The court did not comment on
whether Glik would still have been within these constitutional bounds
if, like Hyde, his cell phone had been concealed. The court suggested,
without analysis, that there may be situations where a right exists, but
a "time, place, and manner" restriction would be appropriate. 55 This
analysis from the First Circuit was important in establishing that there
is a clear constitutional right to record police. However, the fact that
the court had "no occasion to explore [the] limitations" 56 of the rule
leaves the state of the law somewhat confused. 57 It is unclear whether
the constitutional right reaches defendants like Hyde, who do fall
within the statutory scheme. Additionally, the court suggested that
the rule might not apply in other encounters with the police, specifically traffic stops, 58 where the encounter could be characterized as an
"inherently dangerous situation." 59 This suggests that the reasoning
in the Robinson case from Pennsylvania, which grants an exception in
dangerous situations, may have some undefined role in the constitutional calculus.
Although the constitutional rule is clear, its application in situations that are factually distinct from Glik is too unpredictable for it to
help inform citizens of their rights to record police officers.
Whether the law is "clearly established" for a § 1983 claim also
depends on the law of the particular circuit court and the facts of the
police encounter. In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a passenger in a truck
that was stopped by a police officer recorded the encounter and was
arrested. 60 The court acknowledged that in the Third Circuit, there
was enough case law to clearly establish that a police officer has no
53. Td. at 82.
54. Td. at 84.
55. Id.
56. ld.
57. See generally Caycee Hampton, Note, Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and the
Paradox of Citizen necording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011).
58. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (distinguishing Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2010) that determined that the right to film is not clearly established in the context of a traffic
stop because "a traffic stop is worlds apart from an arrest on the Boston Common").
59. !d. (quoting Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. 622 F.3d at 251 ~52.
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"reasonable expectation of privacy when recording conversations
with suspects." 61 However, the arrestee in this case could not recover for the violation of his free speech rights, because "there was insufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers
during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on 'fair
notice' that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping the police during the stop would violate the First Amendment."62 The court reasoned that the decision was "further supported" by the fact that traffic stops have been recognized as "inherently
dangerous situations," suggesting that even where there is a clearly
established right, police officers can violate those rights if the situation is sufficiently dangerous. 63
Although several cases proclaim the First Amendment right to
record a police officer while he is carrying out his public duties, the
case law is too inconsistent and the fact patterns too narrow for a citizen to be able to confidently record police without fear of criminal
prosecution. Striking a balance between a citizen's right to free
speech and a police officer's right to safety and privacy further complicates the situation.
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS

Recording statutes present a unique constitutional conundrum
with a tug-of-war between free speech and legitimate state interests
in police privacy and safety. The First Amendment likely protects the
right of the citizen to record police officers. On the other hand, a police officer's quasi-constitutional right to privacy, which is regularly
analyzed in a similar way to Fourth Amendment rights to privacy, is
given great weight by the court. If the court believes that the police
officer was in a dangerous situation, free speech concerns are given
even less weight. This is essentially a zero-sum analysis-the more
the statute protects the First Amendment, the less likely it is to protect the police officer, and vice versa. Legitimate, although narrow,
concerns of safety and privacy make it difficult to place a balance
where each will be appropriately protected. As shown in Part II, state
statutes vary significantly on the balance between these competing
constitutional concerns. Statutes that are "privacy centered" are

61. I d. at 258.

62. Id. at 262.

63.
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more likely to fall on the side of upholding recording statutes that
protect the privacy of any non-consenting parties, but they also run
the danger of being applied in violation of a citizen's free speech
rights.
Although it might be argued that police should never have a
right to privacy while performing their public duties, this approach
would have many of the same problems as privacy centered statutes-free speech would be completely protected, but it would unnecessarily impede the state from pursuing a legitimate governmental interest. Cases where the value of a citizen's speech is weak
or de minimus and the argument for police privacy is strong would
unnecessary suffer under this scheme. Instead, First Amendment
requirements can be met and the state can adequately protect its
officers if legislatures carefully strike a balance between these two
competing interests. This Part will discuss the tension between the
competing concerns, and finally argue that the best legislative
schemes would place the balance in the form of a rebuttable presumption, which would effectively protect speech rights while allowing room to protect officer privacy in appropriate cases.
A. The First Amendment Right to Record

Although the text of the First Amendment only specifically prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press," 64 the free speech right derived from the First Amendment has been expanded to protect conduct beyond pure speech and
media outlets. 65 The gathering and dissemination of information is
implicitly included in the right to free speech. 66 This right is particularly important, because the free flow of information about public officials is vital to the workings of a free democracy. 67 In order to protect the background principle of allowing for a "free discussion of
governmental affairs," citizens, whether they are members of the
formal media or not, must have a right incidental to the freedom of
speech to record governmental officials engaged in their public du-

64. U.S. CONST. amend. l.
65. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunnifte, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011).
66. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972); Glick, 655 F.3d at 82-83.
67. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (pioneering the theory that speech is essential to representative government and democratic decision making).
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ties. 68 If the information is "about what public officials do on public
property," and it is a "matter[] of public interest," the gathering of
that information is protected. 69
The public's power to gather information about governmental officials not only is constitutional, but also serves a vital practical purpose by checking the power of government. 70 Vincent Blasi argues
that this checking value is of paramount importance because "the
abuse of official power is an especially serious evil-more serious
than the abuse of private power." 71 These considerations are especially prevalent in the abuse of police power. First, "the potential
impact of government on the lives of individuals is unique because of
its capacity to employ legitimized violence," and second, "public officials control the resources which, if misused, can do the maximum
amount of harm.'' 72 Police officers are the public officials that are
most likely to interact with the public, are the primary enforcers of
governmentally legitimized violence, and have little oversight combined with great discretion. 73
The more connected the speech is to matters of public interest,
especially political interest, the more likely it is that the speech will
be protected by the First Amendment. For example, in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 74 the Supreme Court held that an individual's
ability to be sued for libel decreased significantly if the subject of the
speech was a public official. 75 Although the right of every person to
be insulated against libel is important, the Court in this case found
that the right was outweighed by the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.'' 76 The greater the risk of chilling important pub-

68. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
69. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
70. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES.]. 521 (1977).
71. Id. at 538.
72. Td.
73. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
74. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
75. Td. at 271.
76. Td. at 270.
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lie discourse, the more likely it is that First Amendment rights will
take precedent over other important personal rights, such as the
right to privacy.
The Supreme Court has performed a similar analysis regarding
recording statutes. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 77 an illegally obtained recording of a phone call between a union president and a union negotiator regarding a matter of public concern was distributed to media
outlets, which then published the recording. 78 Both the federal recording statute and Pennsylvania's recording statute provide that the
mere disclosure of illegally obtained information is punishable along
with making the initial recording. 79 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the decision was a difficult one because of the tension between privacy and free speech. 80 The Court held that because the
publisher had obtained the information lawfully, the publishing of
that information was protected under the First Amendment because
the information was of public importance. 81 The Court reasoned that
in this case, having information about a public issue discussed in the
public sphere was an important enough interest to justify the loss of
privacy: "[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. One of the costs
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of
privacy." 82
Bartnicki protected the publisher of lawfully obtained illegal recordings, but the holding was narrow-the protection did not cover
the original maker of the recordings. 83 Although the Court decided
that it was worth the loss of privacy to have the recordings be part of
the public discussion, if the person who originally made the recording was found, he or she could be prosecuted for violating wiretapping statutes. The First Circuit dealt with a similar issue concerning
the Massachusetts recording statute in jean v. Massachusetts State Po-

77. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
78. Jd. at 514.
79. ld. at 520 n.3.
80. I d. at 533 (" [T]here are important interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus.").
81. ld. at 534-35.
82. Id. at 534.
83. Id. at 534-35. The question is "both novel and narrow," applying only to those that
disclose the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. I d. at 517.
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lice. 84 In jean, a nanny cam illegally recorded state police officers as
they arrested Paul Pechonis in his home and then conducted a warrantless search of his home. 85 Pechonis provided a copl of the recording to Mary T. Jean, who posted it on her website. 6 The First
Circuit applied a similar reasoning as the Supreme Court in Bartnicki
and held that a court could reasonably conclude that the First
Amendment protected the posting of Pechonis's arrest. 87 Unlike the
recording in the Bartnicki case, which dealt with the privacy of two
private citizens, the privacy interest of the officers in jean was considered "virtually irrelevant" because the recording involved "a
search by police officers of a private citizen's home in front of that
individual, his wife, other members of the family, and at least eight
law enforcement officers." 88 The parties conceded that the "warrantless and potentially unlawful search of a private residence [] is a
matter of public concem." 89 In Bartnicki, the access to public information outweighed the privacy rights of two citizens. Therefore, in a
situation like jean, which dealt with the privacy rights of a law enforcement agency, the scales easily tipped in the direction of public
information, because the facts of the case showed that the privacy
rights of the police were negligible in that instance. 90
Both Bartnicki and jean focused only on the distributors, not the
people who originally made the recordings. In fact, the Court in
Bartnicki explicitly assumed that the statute was constitutionally
permissible as to the recorders. 91 This conclusion was assumed
without analysis and was not related to the case or controversy before the court, and is therefore clearly dicta. The Court's own reasoning utilized in Bartnicki and jean-balancing the benefit to the public
against the interests in protecting the privacy of the recorded partyactually suggest that in the context of police recordings, many wiretapping statutes should be held constitutionally impermissible. The

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

492 F.3d 24 (lst Cir. 2007).
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.

90. Id.
91. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) ("We assume that those [substantial
governmental interests] adequately justify the prohibition in § 2511 (1) (d) against the interceptor's own use of information that he or she acquired.").
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value to the public remains unchanged whether the recorder or the
distributor is prosecuted, so therefore the First Amendment side of
the calculus is just as strong. The jean court made it clear that the
governmental interest in protecting the privacy rights of police during the course of an arrest is not significant enough to impair speech
rights, so therefore the privacy side of the calculus is weak. 92 The
reasoning of Bartnicki and jean, although not squarely about recorders, strongly suggests that recorders of police activity could not be
constitutionally restrained.
B. The Right to Privacy

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 93 In Katz v.
United States, 94 Justice Stewart explained that the Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion." 95 The Court specifically denied that this privacy is
attached to a "constitutionally protected area," but instead held that
" [w] hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 96 After Justice
Stewart clarified the right derived from the Amendment, the concurrence written bf Justice Harlan elucidated his understanding of the
majority rule. 9 Justice Harlan explained that the rule for when
something is protected as private by the Fourth Amendment is a
"twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual

92. It should be remembered that in Bartnicki, the governmental interest at stake was to
protect the privacy of entirely private citizens engaging in what they thought was a private telephone call, and so the Court's assumption that the recorder could be constitutionally protected
was based on entirely different "significant governmental interests" than the interests in police
recording contexts. The Court found that the interests served by the statute were "the interest in
removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations, and second, the interest in
minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted." Id. at 529.
These interests are significantly weaker when the parties the government is aiming to protect are
law enforcement personnel engaging with the public.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
94. 389 u.s. 347 (1967).
95. Id. at 350.
96. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 361 (Harlan,]., concurring).
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(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 98
Where a man exposes "objects, activities, or statements . . . to the
'plain view' of outsiders" exhibiting "no intention to keep them to
himself," there is likely no expectation of privacy. 99
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy from governmental intrusion. However, the rationale behind the Fourth
Amendment extends to encounters beyond those with the government, resulting in a strong public policy against violating the privacy
of individuals, even when the privacy is violated by other individuals.
These privacy rights are usually established by statute, as evidenced
by the many state wiretapping statutes that protect conversations
conducted with a reasonable expectation of privacy, 100 and common
law torts such as libel and violations of publicity. Although it is not
clearly a constitutional violation when a conversation is recorded by
a non-governmental entity, privacy concerns, as developed in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, are repeatedly analyzed in wiretapping
cases, suggesting that they are important enough to weigh heavily
against First Amendment rights in many instances.
Where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that meets
Justice Harlan's two-fold test in Katz (that the individual manifest an
expectation of privacy and that the expectation is reasonable), it is
important to understand under what circumstances this privacy right
impedes on First Amendment speech rights. In this case, the government is regulating conduct that it is generally within the police
powers to regulate (how individuals interact with law enforcement),
but this conduct regulation incidentally burdens free speech. According to First Amendment jurisprudence, governments may only incidentally impede speech rights, by means such as recording laws, if it
can show that the regulation (1) is within the power of the Government; (2) furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; and (3) the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms
"is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 101
Here, wiretapping statutes are undoubtedly within the police power

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra Part !I.A.

101. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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of the government, and the "substantial government interest" 102 the
states mean to further is the privacy rights of citizens, and in cases
involving police officers, the privacy rights and safety of the officers.
Therefore, the first two elements of this test are likely met. However,
in order for a conduct-based statute that incidentally burdens speech
to be constitutional, it must not burden speech any more than is "essential" to protect police officers. This Comment argues that many of
these statutes are unconstitutional, because they fail this element
and prohibit far more speech than is necessary to protect either the
safety or the privacy of police officers.
These two important rights are in opposition in the case of citizens recording police officers. When First Amendment rights to record are strengthened, privacy of officers is necessarily diminished;
when the privacy rights of officers are strengthened, the ability of individuals to record police officers as part of the First Amendment
checking power weakens. Understanding the circumstances under
which either of these rights may be strengthened at the expense of
the other is important to creating a rule that strikes an appropriate
balance. A rule with the correct balance will protect as many and sacrifice as few rights as possible, yet at the same time be clear enough
to allow citizens and police officers to exercise their rights confidently. Part IV proposes a rule that is likely to meet all of these goals.
IV. A

REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CITIZEN
RECORDERS

As written, many state recording statutes, as discussed in Part II,
demonstrably have violated, or are in danger of violating the First
Amendment, because they restrict more speech than is necessary.
However, police officers as citizens are entitled to privacy when their
expectation of privacy is reasonable. Therefore, states must determine how much restriction of speech is "necessary" to protect privacy. In order to walk the line between two strong canons of rights,
legislatures in states with recording statutes that do not require a
reasonable expectation of privacy should amend their laws to include
one. In addition, all of the state legislatures should amend their re-

102. The Supreme Court has observed two general interests that are served by wiretapping
statutes. "[F]irst, the interest in removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations, and second, the interest in minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have
been illegally intercepted." Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
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cording laws to include an express "rebuttable presumption" that
while in the course of their official duties police officers have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
A rebuttable presumption benefits citizen recorders by preventing them from being arrested for recording a police officer. This is
valuable, because many citizens will not record, and their speech will
be chilled, if they perceive that there is a material risk of criminal
prosecution. 103 The rebuttable presumption also benefits the officer,
who would have an opportunity to prove, after the fact, that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and thus justify the prosecution of
the recorder.
This presumption must be strong enough to not allow rebuttal in
any situation where a police officer is interacting with the public in
her official capacity. If it is not, it will be no more useful than a general rule, such as the rule in Washington, that police officers are not
entitled to privacy while engaging in their public duties. Instead, rebuttal should be allowed in very marginal cases where the argument
is very strong that the police officer probably did expect his actions
to be private and the value of the information to the public is low.
There should be very few or no situations where a citizen would be
surprised to learn that he is being prosecuted under the wiretapping
law because the law enforcement officer has overcome the rebuttable
presumption. Because a rebuttable presumption sets the bar higher
than a general rule, it will be more difficult to get citizen recording
cases past the summary judgment stage, and it will be possible to
more easily predict the outcome of these cases without having to
have lengthy discovery or litigation on the facts.
A. Problems with Existing Statutes and Other Proposed Solutions
The statutory schemes addressing this problem have been discussed at length in Part II, but generally attempt to address the problem by: (1) relying only on a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, 104 (2) using a reasonable expectation of privacy
103. Hampton, supra note 57, at 1559 ("If citizens believe----correctly or otherwise------that it
is illegal to record unethical police behavior, the potential for vigilante filming diminishes, and
an important check on governmental authority diminishes correspondingly.").
104. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Dina Mishra, Note, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers' Power, 117 YALE

L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008)

("[S]tates should explicitly permit citizens to record police communications other than those
uttered with the reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded.").
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requirement coupled with a rule that police generally do not have a
right to privacy in their public duties, 105 (3) determining whether
conversations are protected based on whether the recording is secret
or open, 106 and (4) prohibiting all recording, regardless of whether
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy or the recording was
made openly. 107 Another proposed solution has been to enact a
blanket rule that police officers are never entitled to privacy when
acting within the scope of their duties. 108

1. Reasonable expectation of privacy
Statutes such as Pennsylvania's, which determine whether
speech is protected based on whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, are useful to a limited extent but are not ideal. The
biggest danger from such statutes is that citizens may not know
whether they are allowed to record or not. Whether courts have decided that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in cases decided under these statutes is very fact specific and is analyzed separately for each case. Factors such as whether the encounter was on a
street or in a home, whether there were bystanders present, and the
volume at which the conversation was conducted are all relevant inquiries when determining whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. 109 If the determinations are so ad hoc, it is difficult
for both police officers and citizens to shape their behavior, because
the determination about whether the police officer has a right to privacy is not made until the case is litigated. This results in the chilling
of protected First Amendment speech, which consequently decreases
the political and social benefits of "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen" 110 public discourse. Additionally, lengthy litigation is not ideal
for either the officer or the citizen because of prohibitive costs. Furthermore, if the citizen is arrested because an officer is unsure
whether he has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may open the

I 05. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes I 0-11 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
108. Alderman, supra note 4, at 489 ("[T]he right of citizens to record police officers performing their public duties, without fear of punitive and retaliatory prosecution, must be expressly safeguarded in state wiretapping statutes.").
109. See generally Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Henlen,
564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989).
110. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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officer and the city up to potential liability for violation of constitutional rights under§ 1983.
2. Reasonable expectation of privacy plus general rule against police privacy

In general, rules regarding whether police are able to entertain
a reasonable expectation of privacy turn on whether the officer was
engaged in public business in a public space. 111 This rule is both
open to too much interpretation and does not reach far enough to
adequately protect citizens who wish to record their conversations
with law enforcement. Although there are many places that are definitively "public," such as Boston Common in the Glik case, 112 and
there are some places that are clearly private, such as one's own
home, there is also a wide spectrum of places that are located
somewhere in between public and private. Even in situations where
it is unclear whether the space is public or private, it is still unlikely that a police officer interacting with a citizen should have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This spectrum also applies to an officer being engaged in "public business." That is, in addition to the
many situations where officers are clearly engaged in official conduct, such as questioning a witness, there are many other gray areas where citizens may be unsure of their protection, such as when
an off-duty officer intervenes in a situation. It is often in these gray
areas, where police officers are engaging in questionable or borderline conduct, that unethical police behavior happens. These situations are where the individual's interest in having her free speech
protected is at its maximum, and the balance weighs most heavily
toward protection.
Even if it were easy to identify which spaces were public and
which spaces were private, there is still a danger that a police officer would engage in unethical behavior in a private place. In jean
v. Massachusetts State Police, 113 for example, the unlawful behavior of
police officers occurred entirely within the home of the citizen who
was subjected to a warrantless search and arrest. 114 Under this
rule, such a citizen whose nanny cam recorded the encounter would

111. See supra Part ll.A.
112. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
113. 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007).

114. Id. at 25.
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still be criminally liable for recording what happened in his own
home.
3. Secrecy requirement

The statutes that do not protect recordings that are made in secret but do protect recordings that are made openly are constitutionally problematic. The requirement of secrecy is an unworkable, arbitrary delineation. The different outcome in Glik 115 versus Hyde 116 has
no logical constitutional explanation. Both Glik and Hyde attempted
to record abusive conduct by police officers, a matter of public importance. The privacy interests held by the police at the time were
both negligible because they were acting in a public space and were
exposing themselves "to the 'plain view' of outsiders" and had exhibited "no intention to keep [their conduct] to [themselves]." 117
The fact that Simon Glik carried his recording device openly 118 and
Michael Hyde activated his hand-held tape recorder "unbeknownst
to the officers" 119 has no bearing on either the Katz analysis of
whether the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy, or the
Bartnicki and jean analysis of whether the information was important
enough to the public discourse to override a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
These secrecy statutes are the most constitutionally problematic
because they have a demonstrable propensity to arbitrarily deprive
some citizen recorders of their First Amendment rights and not others. Additionally, because the statutes do not include any expectation of privacy requirement, it is difficult to argue that the purpose
of the statute is to protect the privacy of the law enforcement officers. The only consideration that matters for the purpose of these
statutes is whether the recording is surreptitious or open, ignoring
both the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment concerns. This
inevitably deprives civilians like Michael Hyde of their First Amendment rights at the cost of overprotecting the governmental interest
in police officers. Here, the statute fails the requirements of a conduct restriction that burdens free speech, because it is not "narrowly

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Glik, 655 F.3d 78.
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 317, 361 (1967) (Harlan,]., concurring).
Glik, 655 F .3d at 80.
Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965.
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tailored" to serve the governmental interest and restricts much more
speech than is necessary to keep police officers safe. 120

4. Prohibiting all recording regardless of privacy or secrecy
The statutory scheme in Illinois, which restricts all recordings
regardless of secrecy or privacy, has many of the same constitutional
problems as the Massachusetts statutory scheme. Illinois has made
this extreme prohibition of all recordings despite the unnecessarily
high cost to the freedom of speech. Some argue that protecting privacy to such a degree is necessary to protect privacy rights, including
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit: "If you permit the audio recordings, they'll [sic] be a lot more eavesdropping. . . .
There's going to be a lot of this snooping around by reporters and
bloggers . . . . Yes, it's a bad thing. There is such a thing as privacy."121 The major constitutional problem with this approach is that
it protects privacy at all costs even where the Supreme Court has
clearly articulated that privacy considerations must give way, for example, where they are "balanced against the interest in publishing
matters of public importance." 122
This statute was challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois in 2012. 123 The ACLU wished to begin a "police accountability program," in which it would make audiovisual recordings of police officers who were in public places and speaking at a

120. Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (1997) (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
121. Natasha Korecki, judge Casts Doubt on ACLU Challenge to Law Forbidding Audio Recording
of Cops, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.suntimes.com/news/crime/7639298418/j udge-cas ts-dou bt-on -ad u-challenge-to-law-forbidding-audio-recording-of-cops. html. When
this statute was later challenged in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner again voiced his concern
for the privacy of officers:
Privacy is a social value. And so, of course, is public safety ... [A)n officer
may freeze if he sees a journalist recording a conversation between the officer
and a crime suspect, crime victim, or dissatisfied member of the public. He may
be concerned when any stranger moves into earshot, or when he sees a recording device (even a cell phone, for modern cell phones are digital audio recorders)
in the stranger's hand. To distract police during tense encounters with citizens
endangers public safety and undermines effective law enforcement.
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner,]., dissenting), cert. denied, 153 S. Ct.
657, No. 12-318,2012 WL4050487 (Nov. 26, 2012).
122. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
123. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 153 S. Ct. 657, No. 12318,2012 WL4050487 (Nov. 26, 2012).
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volume audible to bystanders. 124 The ACLU sued for declaratory and
injunctive relief that would prohibit the state from enforcing the
statute against them. 125 The Seventh Circuit unequivocally held that
"[a]udio recording is entitled to First Amendment protection," and
that the First Amendment interests at stake were "quite strong." 126
The court determined that the O'Brien standard applied, and required
that the "burden on First Amendment rights must not be greater
than necessary to further the important governmental interest at
stake." 127 The Illinois statute failed this test. The state's interest in
protecting the privacy of the officers were weak, because the recordings would have been of public conversations where the officers had
no reasonable expectation of privacy, 128 and the statute burdened
"far more" speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests.129
The Illinois statute flatly bans all recordings that are made without total consent of all participants. This burdens a large amount of
protected speech without providing ample alternative methods of
communication. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has considered the constitutional calculus and determined that free speech
that facilitates "participation in public affairs" is worth at least some
"attendant loss ofprivacy." 130
5. Blanket rule that police may never have an expectation ofprivacy when
acting in their official capacity 131

Although this rule gets closest to the benefits that come from a
rebuttable presumption, it reaches too far and leaves no room for
more extreme cases. There may be situations where police officers
are acting within their official duty in technical terms, but the circumstances clearly show that their expectation of privacy was reasonable and the cost of a citizen recording them was simply too high.

124.
125.

ld. at 588.
ld.

126. ld. at 597.
127. ld. at 605.
128. id.at 605-06.
129. !d. at 586.
130. Id.
131. Alderman, supra note 4, at

489.
207

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

Situations such as these will be discussed later in the section about
possible rebuttable situations. 132
B. Benefits of a Rebuttable Presumption

A strong presumption in favor of the citizen in police officer recordings will effectively tip the balance of power in favor of those
that are more vulnerable. Situations in which the police interact with
civilians are ones in which power is skewed heavily in favor of the
police officer, resulting in a significant danger for abusive behavior.133 This power balance tips even further in the direction of the
law enforcement officer in the context of a traffic stop, the situation
in which most citizens encounter the police. 134 The police officer in
this situation has a very large amount of discretion, 135 and citizens
may either be unaware of their rights or unintentionally give up
some of their rights by granting the officer permission to search their
car. 136 There is little to no oversight to "restrict[] these police powers from being utilized as a pretext for criminal investigation, as a

132. See infra Part Ill. C.
133. See Hampton, supra note 57, at 1559 ("Freedom of expression has particular significance with respect to government because it is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression. This is particularly true
of law enforcement officials, who are granted substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties." (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir.
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); David T. McTaggart, Note, Reciprocity on the Streets:
Reflections on the Fourth Amendment and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1233,
1241-1242 (2001) ("There is always a risk that [officers] might make impassioned decisions in
the heat of the moment that might prove 'unreasonable' in retrospect. When an overzealous police officer does not need to overcome procedural requirements before intruding upon an individual's liberty, the risk that he might abuse his authority becomes very real."); Mishra, supra
note 104.
134. Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men°, 50 Cl.EV.
ST. L. REV. 425, 429 (2003) (estimating that "there are over one hundred million traffic stops
each year in the United States").
135. For example:
Once a motorist is lawfully stopped, police, without any suspicion beyond the initial
traffic offense, may order a driver and passenger from the vehicle and request consent
to search the vehicle. Consent is virtually always given, and the scope of the search
justified by the consent is limited only by what the police are looking for, which is
almost always drugs. Therefore the police can search anywhere once consent is obtained. In addition, police are not required to inform motorists that they can refuse
consent. . . . They may also issue a summons, arrest the motorist, give a written or
verbal warning, or do nothing at all.
Id. at 431-32.
136. See id. at 431.
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means of retaliating against an uncooperative motorist, or simply selectively enforcing the law [.] " 13 7
This presumption also increases the chances that citizens will
create evidentiary records of their encounters that are beneficial to
both police and citizens. When a constitutional violation has actually
occurred, the evidentiary record is very helpful to citizens bringing
suit under § 1983, as such suits often turn on whether the jury believes the plaintiff or the officer. 138 It would also help to insulate the
majority of officers who perform their jobs lawfully by supplying evidentiary material to defend against accusations of misconduct.
Wherever there is a factual dispute as to the events that took place
during an interaction with a police officer and a citizen, a rule that
incentivizes the creation of more evidentiary records will be beneficial to all parties involved. Police departments themselves have been
increasingly using cameras to record their interactions with the public in order to shield themselves from false accusations of misconduct.139
The most important advantage this rule has when compared to
other proposed solutions is that it provides the greatest amount of
clarity to the citizen. If the bar for an enforcement officer to show a
reasonable expectation of privacy is high, it is much safer for the citizen to take the risk to record an encounter with the police. Additionally, if the police know that the wiretapping law can only be used to
arrest citizens in truly exceptional circumstances, they will be less
likely to risk arresting someone who is simply annoying them under
the pretext of arresting them for violating the recording law. Additionally, clarity in the law is helpful not only for enforcement officers
and citizens when they are making decisions, but it is also invaluable
for purposes of litigating a § 1983 claim. If a citizen is arrested under a wiretapping law for recording a police officer, it will be much

137. Id. at 433.
138. Mishra, supra note 104, at 1554 ("When plaintiffs do bring§ 1983 actions, they face
significant evidentiary hurdles. Civil juries tend to trust police officers' testimony over suspected
criminals' testimony. Where courts permit citizen recordings to be introduced as evidence, the
recordings powerfully rebut jury bias favoring police credibility.").
139. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 360-364 (2010); Lisa A.
Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute
Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1007 (2009)
(describing the benefits that flow to both civilians and law enforcement officers when recordings
are more available).
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easier for that civilian to succeed in a claim for damages under
§ 1983. This will provide an incentive for police officers who wish to
avoid liability by only arresting citizens in truly exceptional circumstances. Although Glik v. Cunniffe 140 established that the right to record police officers is clearly established in the First Circuit, other circuits see the rip,ht as being less clearly established for purposes of
§ 1983 claims. 41 If the states were to amend their statutes to include this rebuttable presumption, the law would be much more
likely to be "clearly established" in all of the circuit courts. Uniformity in interpreting such an important constitutional principle is desirable so that citizens can be sure of their rights. Clarity would also
benefit the police in § 1983 suits, because an officer will not pursue
lengthy and costly litigation to defend a § 1983 claim unless the circumstances were exceptional enough to show that a reasonable officer in his position would not have known that the action was a
constitutional violation. 142
C. Possible Rebuttable Situations

Because of the impossibility of foreseeing all possible situations
where a citizen may record a police officer while the officer is in the
course of his public business, a safety valve is necessary for a strong
rule to be effective and not produce absurd results. Although the bar
for rebutting the presumption should be quite high, it is still possible that there will be unusual cases where the police officer can successfully argue that he enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy.
One such situation may be where a police officer was acting undercover and encountered a citizen who then recorded the encounter.
The citizen's free speech rights are weak, because the citizen would
likely not know that the person they recorded was a police officer and
will have the same expectations about recording them as they would
when recording any other citizen. The governmental interest in the
privacy of the law enforcement officer is significant, because it is es-

140. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
141. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating "it
was . . . clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when recording conversations with suspects," but "there was insufficient case law establishing a
right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on
'fair notice' that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during the
stop would violate the First Amendment").
142. See id. at 255.
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sential to the ability of the police officer to do his or her job effectively.
In such a situation, the officer's privacy is linked to his safety on the
job as well as the safety of the community he is working to protect.
The officer's safety should be a consideration in determining
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy only if the loss
of privacy would cause the loss in safety. This would mean that there
is a strong governmental interest in protecting the privacy of the officer in order to keep him safe. A situation where an officer is working undercover may be one of these situations. However, the mere
fact that a situation is dangerous is not justification for arresting a
citizen with a recorder under a wiretapping statute. Some courts
have suggested that where police officers are in a dangerous situation, they can make such arrests in order to control the situation. For
example, in Hornberger v. American Broadcasting Cos., the court considered whether the police officers had reasonable concern for their
safety after the suspect in a traffic stop said that he disliked cops. 143
Although this may have made the law enforcement officers feel less
safe about the situation, the fact that the encounter was being recorded without their knowledge would not have changed the safety of
the situation. This kind of situation should not be used to tip the
scales in favor of rebutting the presumption and arresting the suspect because he was recording them. It was the language of the suspect that may have created a dangerous situation. The recording had
no bearing on whether the situation was dangerous or not.
Other possible circumstances where police officers may enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy while engaging in public business
are situations where officers must discuss confidential information
with a civilian, discuss a case that has not been released to the public, or discuss a plan to apprehend a suspect. These are the types of
conversations in which there is a strong governmental interest in
maintaining confidentiality and privacy, even though the police officers are engaged in public business.
Finally, there may be situations where police officers are technically doing public business, but their actions are of the kind where
they would not anticipate interacting with anyone in the public.
These include meetings with other police officers, superiors, or representatives from other agencies. If a citizen happens to become a
party to one of these conversations, the context of the conversation

143. 799 A.2d 566, 576 (N.j. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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should indicate that this is a situation where the police have an expectation that they will not be recorded and that expectation is justifiable.
In summary, situations where the presumption can be rebutted
are rare. This rarity is in the best interest of the public so that citizens can be confident about their rights, but the ability of a police
officer to rebut the presumption is important to allow for unforeseen
or extraordinary events where it is clear that the officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Recording statutes present a difficult problem where two important sets of rights will inevitably come into conflict. When making the judgment about which right should be protected at the expense of the other, we should prefer the right that is most central to
the workings of a free democracy. Unless the public has the opportunity to observe and disseminate information about their government officials, we will lose an important checking power to keep police officers and their superiors from abusing their power. Without
that right, the public would continue to be vulnerable to all of the
unethical and abusive conduct perpetrated by law enforcement that
has been caught on tape throughout the years. The right must be
preserved even at the expense of the rights of the government officials whose privacy may be infringed on. However, where infringing
on those rights is not necessary to preserving a full and robust public
dialogue, privacy rights should be protected as vigorously as speech
rights. When legislatures strike a careful balance, they can avoid
many rules that are over- or under-inclusive and secure as many
rights for as many people as possible.
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